

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0467

INFO USMISSION USBERLIN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 12001

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGOV PFOR US UK UR FR GW WB

SUBJECT: SECOND SOVIET DEMARCHE ON SCHUETZ STATEMENT

REFS: (A) MOSCOW 9652; (B) MOSCOW 9403;

(C) BONN 8303; (D) MOSCOW 4914

SUMMARY: BONN GROUP CONSIDERATION OF REPLY TO SECOND SOVIET DEMARCHE ON SCHUETZ STATEMENT IS BOGGED DOWN BY FRG INSISTENCE THAT ALLIES MAKE REFERENCE TO FRG-USSR "EXPERT TALKS" ON INVITATIONS MODALITIES AND REBUFF THE SOVIET "ADVANCE WARNING." DISCUSSION OF MATTER HAS LED TO EXCHANGE IN BONN GROUP ON MORE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION OF FRG-USSR CONTACTS ON QA-RELATED MATTERS. END SUMMARY.

1. IN BONN GROUP CONSIDERATION OF WHETHER AND HOW TO RESPOND TO THE SECOND SOVIET DEMARCHE (REFS A AND B) ON THE SCHUETZ STATEMENT, THE FRG REP (LUECKING) HAS INSISTED THAT THE ALLIES MAKE A REFERENCE TO THE FRG-
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USSR EXPERT TALKS WHICH BEGAN IN 1973 ON THE

INVITATIONS QUESTION. BASIS OF FRG DESIRE IS TO ENSURE THAT THE FRG-USSR UNDERSTANDING ON INVITATIONS TO UNOFFICIAL EVENTS IN BERLIN NOT BECOME A DEAD LETTER. THIS, EVEN THOUGH BONN HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO DELIVER ON ITS UNDERTAKINGS IN THE DEAL. BONN BELIEVES THAT AN ALLIED REFERENCE TO THE EXPERT TALKS WHICH RESULTED IN THE UNDERSTANDING WOULD BE A SIGNAL TO THE SOVIETS THAT THEY SUPPORT BOTH THE UNDERSTANDING AND FURTHER FRG-SOVIET CONTACTS TO RESOLVE IN PRACTICAL WAYS THE PROBLEMS WITH IT AND WITH OTHER QA-RELATED MATTERS.

2. WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF DISCUSSING VARIOUS DRAFTS OF REPLIES TO THE SECOND SOVIET DEMARCHE, THE ALLIED REPS IN A JULY 13 MEETING TOOK THE FOLLOWING LINE:

-- A) FRG DESIRE TO HAVE "EXPERT TALKS" WITH SOVIETS IS UNDERSTANDABLE AND JUSTIFIED SINCE THEY SOMETIMES ARE THE ONLY WAY OF RESOLVING PRACTICAL PROBLEMS;

-- B) COORDINATION IN ADVANCE BETWEEN THE FRG AND THE ALLIES OF SUCH TALKS IS ESSENTIAL;

-- C) FORMALLY TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE TALKS IN AN ALLIED REPLY TO THE SOVIETS WAS UNDESIRABLE SINCE THIS COULD IMPLY THAT THE "EXPERT TALKS" WERE HELD UNDER QUADRIPARTITE AUSPICES AND THEIR RESULTS COULD BE INTERPRETED AS ADDITIONS TO THE QA.

3. LUECKING ASKED IF ALLIES WOULD BE WILLING WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF AN ALLIED REPLY TO THE SECOND SOVIET DEMARCHE TO GIVE SOME KIND OF ORAL INDICATION TO THE SOVIETS THAT THEY ARE AWARE OF THE FRG-USSR CONTACTS AND THAT THE SEARCH IN SUCH A FORUM FOR PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS IS AGREEABLE. LUECKING SAID HE WOULD "LIKE TO INCLUDE VAN WELL'S SIGNAL."

4. FRENCH REP (BOISSIEU) SAID IT DEPENDED ON THE DRAFTING. HE THEN DEVELOPED THE FOLLOWING TEXT WHICH WOULD BE FOR ORAL DELIVERY TO THE SOVIETS:
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BEGIN TEXT

WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FRG, WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS IN THE PAST HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THIS PROBLEM, SHARES THE POSITION OF THE THREE POWERS AS SET OUT IN THEIR STATEMENTS OF MAY 28, 1976 AND THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD

CONTINUE FOR ITS PART TO ABIDE BY PROCEDURES WHICH BOTH
FULLY CONFORM TO THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE QA
AND TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE INTERESTS OF ALL PARTIES
CONCERNED. END TEXT.

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THE US REP SAID HE BELIEVED THERE WOULD BE NO
OBJECTION IN PRINCIPLE TO SAYING SOMETHING TO THE
SOVIETS BUT THE OCCASION HAD TO BE SELECTED VERY
CAREFULLY AND HE WONDERED IF THAT OF AN ALLIED REPLY
TO A SOVIET COMPLAINT WAS THE RIGHT ONE. UK REP (HITCH)
INDICATED THAT FRG-USSR "EXPERT TALKS" WERE PREFERABLE
TO QUADRIpartite TALKS ON THE QA. LUECKING RECALLED
THAT ALL FOUR IN OSLO HAD AGREED THAT QUADRIpartite
CONSULTATIONS WERE NOT GOOD.

5. LUECKING WAS DUBIOUS IF THE FRENCH LANGUAGE WOULD

REALLY BE ENOUGH OF A SIGNAL. HE WOULD STUDY THE TEXT. HE SAW A FURTHER PROBLEM IN WHAT BONN INTERPRETED AS A THREAT IN THE SOVIET DEMARCHE TO CAUSE PROBLEMS ON THE TRANSIT ROUTES FOR PARTICIPANTS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL GATHERINGS IN BERLIN. LUECKING COMPLAINED ABOUT THE "WEAKNESS" OF A DRAFT PROPOSED BY BOISSIEU WHICH
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BASICALLY CONFIRMED THE POSITION OF THE FIRST ALLIED REPLY. HE SAID THE SOVIET THREAT MUST BE REPUDIATED, AND COMPLAINED THAT MORE AND MORE THE BONN GROUP COULD NOT AGREE ON HOW TO RESPOND TO SOVIET PROTESTS.

6. THE ALLIED REPS SAID THEY DID NOT INTERPRET THE SOVIET DEMARCHE AS THREATENING TRANSIT TRAFFIC. RATHER, THE "ADVANCE WARNING" HAD TO DO WITH POSSIBLE SOVIET EFFORTS TO PRECLUDE EVENTS FROM BEING SCHEDULED FOR BERLIN, AND POSSIBLY WITH SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF BERLINERS IN FRG-USSR EXCHANGE GROUPS.

7. THE SENAT REP (MEICHSNER) SAID HE BELIEVED THE SOVIET DEMARCHES SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS ABSTRACTIONS BUT RATHER AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE IN FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF INVITATIONS MODALITIES. BOISSIEU AGREED THAT A SOLUTION WAS REQUIRED BUT SAID IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR THE ALLIES, AFTER HAVING SAID IN THEIR FIRST REPLY THAT INVITATIONS TO PRIVATELY-ORGANIZED EVENTS WERE A MATTER FOR THE ORGANIZERS, TO INDICATE NOW THAT WE OR THE FRG WERE LOOKING FOR PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS. LUECKING SAID IT MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THAT THE LATEST SOVIET DEMARCHE REPRESENTS A "CHANGE IN DEGREE." A SOLUTION MUST BE FOUND AND THE ALLIES SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT OF FRG-USSR CONTACTS.

8. COMMENT: FRG HAS GOTTEN ITSELF INTO THIS PROBLEM ON INVITATIONS BY ENGAGING IN "EXPERT TALKS" WITH VIRTUALLY NO CONSULTATION WITH THE ALLIES, AND THEN REACHING AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE SOVIETS ON WHICH BONN WAS UNABLE TO DELIVER. BONN IS NOW DEEPLY FEARFUL THAT THE SOVIETS WILL (AS THEY WARN IN THEIR DEMARCHE) DO WHAT THEY CAN TO KEEP WEST BERLINERS FROM PARTICIPATING WITH FRG GROUPS IN EXCHANGES AND TO PREVENT THAT WEST BERLIN BE DESIGNATED BY PRIVATE GROUPS AS SITE OF INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS OR CONFERENCES. WE BELIEVE THE SOVIETS HAVE ENOUGH POSSIBILITIES TO DO SO SHORT OF DIRECTING THE GDR TO HARASS TRANSIT TRAVELERS INVOLVED IN SUCH THINGS.

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FRG DESIRE IS, THUS, THAT THE ALLIES HELP PULL THEIR BACON OUT OF THE FIRE BY SIGNALING WHAT AMOUNTS TO A RETREAT FROM THE MAY 28 REPLY TO THE FIRST SOVIET DEMARCHE. IN THAT REPLY, WHICH GENSCHER CLEARED PERSONALLY, WE SAID INVITATIONS TO PRIVATE EVENTS -- WHICH COULD NOT POSSIBLY AFFECT STATUS -- WERE UP TO THE ORGANIZERS OF THESE EVENTS. THE FRG WOULD NOW HAVE US INDICATE THAT, NEVERTHELESS, PERHAPS AN ARRANGEMENT SUCH AS THE FRG-USSR UNDERSTANDING ON SPORTS EVENTS IN THE WSB (WHICH BONN WAS UNABLE TO IMPLEMENT) SHOULD APPLY. IN EFFECT, IF THE ALLIES DID THIS, IT WOULD AMOUNT TO MAKING AN ADDITION TO THE QA.

ANOTHER PART OF THE PROBLEM IS THAT THERE IS NO COMMON POSITION AMONG THE WEST GERMANS THEMSELVES OR BETWEEN THE FRG AND THE SENAT. LUECKING REPEATEDLY TELLS THE ALLIES THAT NO COMMON POSITION WILL BE POSSIBLE BEFORE THE ELECTIONS. BUT AT THE SAME TIME HE SAYS GENSCHER WILL PROBABLY RAISE THE MATTER WITH GROMYKO ON THE EDGE OF THE UNGA IN NEW YORK IN SEPTEMBER.

WE THUS BELIEVE IT IS PREMATURE TO GIVE ANY SIGNAL TO THE SOVIETS ON THE INVITATIONS QUESTION. THE WEST GERMANS AND BERLINERS HAVE NO AGREED PLAN ON HOW TO MOVE AHEAD, AND THEY OBVIOUSLY ARE NOT GOING TO

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DISCUSS THE MATTER PRIOR TO THE ELECTIONS WITH THE PRIVATE GROUPS WHICH WILL HAVE TO GIVE ASSENT ON WHAT THE FRG WILL OFFER THE SOVIETS. WE ASSUME THAT BONN WILL NOT AGAIN MAKE THE MISTAKE OF COMMITTING PRIVATE GROUPS WITHOUT THEIR PERMISSION. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE SEE ANOTHER REASON (IN ADDITION TO BRINGING THE SOVIETS AROUND) WHY BONN WANTS ALLIED SUPPORT IN THE INVITATIONS ISSUE. IF THE ALLIES ARE ON BOARD, THEN THE FRG CAN MAKE USE OF THIS FACT IN LINING UP PRIVATE GERMAN ORGANIZATIONS TO ACCEPT WHATEVER BONN AND MOSCOW FINALLY WORK OUT. THE POSSIBILITY THAT BONN WOULD USE ALLIED BACKING IN THIS WAY IS ANOTHER REASON FOR CAUTION ON OUR PART.

NEVERTHELESS, IT SEEMS RATHER CLEAR TO US THAT IF THE FRG/SENAT WERE TO COME TO THE ALLIES WITH A WELL-CONCEIVED AND WELL DEVELOPED SCENARIO FOR FRG-USSR CONTACTS WHICH INCLUDED SOME KIND OF ALLIED CONFIDENTIAL

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SIGNAL TO THE SOVIETS, WE COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT REFUSE. END COMMENT.

9. WE THEREFORE RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING AS THE US POSITION:

-- A) WE STRONGLY AGREE WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF ENSURING THAT NON-OFFICIAL INTERNATIONAL EVENTS IN BERLIN CONTINUE TO TAKE PLACE. WHILE THE QA DOES NOT REQUIRE INVITATIONS TO SUCH EVENTS FROM THE SENAT, IF THE ORGANIZATION AND THE SENAT AGREE WE HAVE NO OBJECTION. IT SHOULD BE REALIZED, HOWEVER, THAT SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD AMOUNT TO AN INFORMAL ADDITION TO THE QA, AND IF THE ALLIES WERE INVOLVED IN ANY WAY IT WOULD VIRTUALLY BE A FORMAL AND UNAVOIDABLE REQUIREMENT IN SOVIET EYES;

-- B) IN ABSENCE OF AN FRG/SENAT SPECIFIC PLAN AND PROPOSAL ON HOW TO MOVE AHEAD, WE BELIEVE IT PREMATURE TO PASS ANY SIGNAL TO THE SOVIETS;

-- C) NEVERTHELESS, WE WOULD BE PREPARED AFTER CAREFUL COORDINATION TO GIVE A SIGNAL TO THE SOVIETS IF IT IS CONCLUDED THAT ONLY SUCH A SIGNAL WOULD BREAK THE IMPASSE AND ENSURE THE FUTURE OF BERLIN AS AN INTERNATIONAL MEETING PLACE.

10. WE ALSO RECOMMEND THAT WE WORK FOR A RELATIVELY SHORT REPLY TO THE SECOND SOVIET STATEMENT ON SCHUETZ WHICH RECONFIRMS THE ORIGINAL RESPONSE BUT ALSO WHICH DEALS IN A MODERATE WAY WITH THE "ADVANCE WARNING."

11. ACTION REQUESTED: THE DEPARTMENT APPROVE THE RECOMMENDATIONS IN PARAS 9 AND 10 ABOVE.
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